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LOSING THE DIGITAL SHIRT OFF YOUR BACK: 
APPLYING THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET 
GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT TO VIRTUAL 
PROPERTY BETTING 
ERIK GERSTNER? 
ABSTRACT 
In recent years, a myriad of websites have been established, 
which offer gambling to U.S.-based customers via the Internet, 
using virtual items existing only within the realms of online video 
games as currency. A relatively new development, this virtual 
property has been addressed by courts very little, leaving many 
questions about how the law of the U.S. would and should treat it 
for purposes including but not limited to gambling. Because virtual 
property shares many characteristics with tangible property, it is 
likely to be found to share many of the same legal aspects as the 
latter, which would permit the Justice Department to attack it as 
it has other forms of gambling throughout the years. 
 One form of regulation which the U.S. government might 
use to regulate this virtual property gambling is the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA). In 2011, the U.S. 
government used the provisions of the UIGEA to shut down major 
websites offering online poker and other forms of gambling within 
the U.S., targeting the payment processors handling funds from 
American customers. If the Justice Department finds that virtual 
property is analogous to tangible property, it would likely approach 
regulation of this market in a similar manner as it did in 2011. 
This Note argues that because virtual property gambling is a 
multibillion-dollar business and should be seen as property in its 
own right, regulation via the UIGEA, or other sources is inevitable. 
                                                                                                            
? The Author is a JD Candidate at William & Mary Law School. He wishes 
to thank: his family for their endless patience and support throughout his edu-
cation; the Law School faculty for their advice and insights throughout the pro-
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INTRODUCTION 
 On April 15, 2011, the U.S. Justice Department shook the 
poker world when, acting under the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA), it unveiled indictments and 
filed civil lawsuits against the owners and operators of the three 
largest Internet poker companies operating in the country, al-
leging that their companies continued to accept payments and 
financial transactions from American citizens after the passage of 
the Act.1 Since this date, known colloquially in the poker community 
as “Black Friday,” online poker activity in the United States has 
remained considerably reduced, as very few providers are willing 
to continually risk accepting financial transactions from Ameri-
can customers.2 
 Five years later, while traditional online gambling in the 
United States remains limited, a new form of betting has become 
widespread, centered around competitive video games, or eSports.3 
Unlike online poker rooms and casinos, however, these eSports 
wagers are not being placed with a “real money” balance, but 
rather with virtual property—in this case, digital items created 
by game developers that only exist within the framework of the 
games themselves.4 While these items do not have any fixed 
                                                                                                            
1 Martin Harris, Black Friday: Reliving Pokers Darkest Day Five Years 
Later, POKERNEWS (Apr. 12, 2016), https://pokernews.com/news/2016/04/black 
-friday-five-years-later-24506.htm [https://perma.cc/X94J-KAHQ]. The three 
companies specifically named were PokerStars, Full Tilt Poker, and Absolute 
Poker. Id.; see also U.S. ATT’Y S.D.N.Y., MANHATTAN U.S. ATTORNEY CHARGES 
PRINCIPALS OF THREE LARGEST INTERNET POKER COMPANIES WITH BANK FRAUD, 
ILLEGAL GAMBLING OFFENSES AND LAUNDERING BILLIONS IN ILLEGAL GAMBLING 
PROCEEDS (2011), https://www.justice.gov/archive/usao/nys/pressreleases/April11 
/scheinbergetalindictmentpr.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q94M-GCSG]; First Amended 
Complaint, U.S. v. PokerStars, 11 Civ. 2564 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), http://online.wsj 
.com/public/resources/documents/FullTiltAmendSuit_Sept20_2011.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/M38X-2JK3]. 
2 Harris, supra note 1. 
3 eSports is defined as “a form of sports where the primary aspects of the 
sport are facilitated by electronic systems ….” Juho Hamari & Max Sjöblom, 
What is eSports and why do people watch it?, 27 INTERNET RES. 211, 211 (2017). 
4 Shaun Assael, Skin in the Game, ESPN (Jan. 20, 2017), http://www.espn 
.com/espn/feature/story/_/id/18510975/how-counter-strike-turned-teenager-com 
pulsive-gambler [https://perma.cc/T65W-E6PZ]. 
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value, the rarest are highly sought after, and command signif-
icant real money value; for example, in 2013, one item from the 
game Dota 2 sold for $38,000.5 Further, until recently,6 betting with 
these items was a multibillion-dollar industry.7 On a single website 
in 2015, bettors from around the world placed over $1 million in 
wagers on at least fourteen separate Counter-Strike: Global Of-
fense (CS:GO) matches.8 According to the BBC, the total video 
game betting market may be worth up to £4 billion;9 in dollars, 
approximately $5 billion was wagered in virtual items in 2016.10 
 Given the amount of money at stake, as well as the current 
unregulated state of virtual property, it seems likely that the U.S. 
government will be interested in stepping in and closing these 
betting markets to American citizens.11 One potential avenue 
                                                                                                            
5 Wesley Yin-Poole, Someone bought a Dota 2 courier for $38,000, EUROGAMER 
(June 11, 2013), http://www.eurogamer.net/articles/2013-11-06-someone-bought 
-a-dota-2-courier-for-USD38-000 [https://perma.cc/D9MB-4XR8]. Further, ac-
cording to Yin-Poole, another piece of virtual property sold in 2010 for a stag-
gering $635,000. Id. 
6 In 2016, Valve, the publisher of Counter-Strike: Global Offensive (CS:GO) 
and Dota 2, sent cease-and-desist letters to many of the largest websites offer-
ing gambling with items from those two games. Assael, supra note 4. 
7 CS:GO gambling alone saw $5 billion in virtual item wagering in 2016, 
despite the cease-and-desist letters. Id. 
8 CS:GO is a team-based first-person shooter video game, in which the players 
form two teams that compete against each other (terrorists and counterterror-
ists). Stephen Totilo, An Hour with Counter-Strike: GO, KOTAKU (Aug. 25, 
2011), http://www.kotaku.com/5834542/an-hour-with-counter-strike-go [https:// 
perma.cc/Y348-6C37]. In its most common gameplay format, the terrorists at-
tempt to plant a bomb on a specific site within an in-game world, and the counter-
terrorists attempt to stop them from doing so. Id. If the bomb is planted and 
explodes, the terrorists win, and if it is planted but is defused, the counterter-
rorists win. Either team may also win a round if it eliminates all the players 
on the other team prior to the bomb being planted. Id.; see also HwanZike, Top 
100 CSGL matches by total $value bet, REDDIT (Sep. 12, 2015), https://www 
.reddit.com/r/csgobetting/comments/3knxy2/top_100_csgl_matches_by_total 
_value_bet/ [https://perma.cc/W5KP-NXAG]. 
9 Rory Cellan-Jones, YouTuber Nepenthez charged over video game gambling 
site, BBC (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37385555 [https:// 
perma.cc/PX87-7BHP]. 
10 Assael, supra note 4. 
11 Bryce Blum (esportslaw), I’m Bryce Blum, an attorney with a full-time 
practice in esports law (including CS:GO), AMA!, REDDIT (Feb. 3, 2016), https:// 
www.reddit.com/r/GlobalOffensive/comments/440u1w/im_bryce_blum_an_at 
torney_with_a_fulltime/czmi2r8 [https://perma.cc/R9NH-BK6J] (Regulation is 
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would be an attempt to apply the UIGEA to virtual property, and 
thus shut down any and all providers of virtual property betting 
in a single “Black Friday”-esque stroke.12 This Note will examine 
the legal framework surrounding virtual property and gambling, 
and argue that it is likely that the federal government will indeed 
wish to step in and regulate virtual property gambling, with the 
UIGEA being the government’s most likely tool for doing so. Part I 
will provide an overview of virtual property and the limited legal 
analysis of it thus far.13 Part II will examine the framework of the 
UIGEA and its previous applications by the Justice Department, 
including its application toward online poker.14 Part III will dis-
cuss whether the UIGEA’s text permits its application toward virtual 
property.15 Finally, Part IV will discuss the policy concerns inherent 
in an application of the UIGEA to virtual property, and examine 
alternative forms of regulation that may be preferable instead.16 
I.  WHAT IS VIRTUAL PROPERTY? 
 In general, property is often referred to as a “bundle of 
sticks,” or rights attached to a given piece of property; of these 
“sticks,” the most common ones are: “(1) the right to transfer; (2) the 
right to exclude; (3) the right to use; and (4) the right to destroy.”17 
While this is fairly intuitive when dealing with tangible goods, it 
can be somewhat more difficult to comprehend in virtual realms.18 
It is for this reason that there have been very few reported cases 
specifically dealing with virtual property in video games and 
                                                                                                            
“inevitable, though predicting when would be total guesswork.”). Also, note 
that other governments have already begun applying their own gambling laws 
to virtual item betting. See, e.g., Joe Donnelly, First prosecutions made in rela-
tion to videogame betting in the UK, PC GAMER (Sept. 16, 2016), http://www 
.pcgamer.com/first-prosecutions-made-in-relation-to-videogame-betting-in-the 
-uk/ [https://perma.cc/GY6E-3GT7]. 
12 Harris, supra note 1. 
13 See infra Part I. 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 See infra Part III. 
16 See infra Part IV. 
17 Justin M. Ackerman, Note, An Online Gamer’s Manifesto: Recognizing 
Virtual Property Rights by Replacing End User Licensing Agreements in Vir-
tual Worlds, 6 PHX. L. REV. 137, 143 (2012). 
18 Id. 
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related issues,19 despite the large digital economy that has devel-
oped in recent years.20 
 Given this lack of treatment by U.S. courts, it may be 
helpful to view video game virtual property through similar ana-
logues. One of these is Internet domain names, which, in contrast, 
have seen substantial litigation since the Internet boom in the 
1990s.21 Like digital items in a video game, domain names only 
exist electronically;22 the “owner” of a domain name is the party 
who gets to decide to which space on the Internet (more commonly 
known as a website) the domain name points.23 In one landmark 
domain name case, Kremen v. Cohen, the Ninth Circuit developed 
a three-part test to determine whether a property right existed in 
the domain name in question: “[f]irst, there must be an interest 
capable of precise definition; second, it must be capable of exclusive 
possession or control; and third, the putative owner must have 
established a legitimate claim to exclusivity.”24 The court determined 
that the domain name met all three of these prongs, and thus the 
plaintiff indeed had an intangible property right in it.25 
 Applying this three-part test, virtual items in many video 
games and other virtual worlds would qualify as property, similar 
to domain names. First, virtual items are precisely defined be-
cause each individual item is given a unique identification code 
by the programmers who create it.26 Second, because each item 
                                                                                                            
19 One of these few cases is Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 
593 (E.D. Pa. 2007), in which a customer of the game “Second Life” sued the 
game’s publisher after it revoked in-game property he had purchased; ulti-
mately, the case settled out-of-court, with no legal resolution of the property 
issues. Benjamin Duranske, Bragg v. Linden Lab—Confidential Settlement 
Reached; ‘Marc Woebegone’ Back in Second Life, VIRTUALLY BLIND (Oct. 4, 2007), 
http://www.virtuallyblind.com/2007/10/04/bragg-linden-lab-settlement/ [https:// 
perma.cc/6Y4S-AV8G]. 
20 See supra text accompanying notes 5–9. 
21 Domain Name Case Law, HARV. L. SCH., https://cyber.harvard.edu/prop 
erty00/domain/CaseLaw.html [https://perma.cc/SE6V-6ELW]. 
22 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 145. 
23 Id. 
24 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1030 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing G.S. Ras-
mussen & Assoc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., 958 F.2d 896, 903 (9th Cir. 1992)). 
25 Id. 
26 Steam—the platform owned by Valve, and on which Dota 2 and CS:GO, 
among many other games, run, for example—utilizes tradeable in-game items 
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has this unique identification code, it can only be in the control of 
a single accountholder, and others cannot take it against this 
accountholder’s wishes, meaning that it is exclusive.27 Finally, 
one could presume that this accountholder, by virtue of the fact 
that it is in her account, will be able to claim exclusivity over the 
item. Thus, it would seem that video game items would qualify as 
property under the test put forth in Kremen. 
 Though the above test seems straightforward, there is a 
major complication. According to the End User License Agree-
ment (EULA) or Terms of Service (TOS) found in nearly every 
piece of software today, in many cases any in-game property is 
either impliedly or explicitly deemed not to be owned by a player, 
and is instead controlled to at least some degree by the game’s 
publisher.28 These agreements range in severity from reserving 
limited control over items with the publisher, to explicitly stating 
that users retain no ownership stake in in-game items what-
soever.29 This would seem to conflict with the exclusivity prongs 
of the test cited in Kremen, as in even the most lenient of these 
                                                                                                            
that must provide a persistent 64-bit identification code for each item. Alexan-
derCzR, Understanding Item ID’s, REDDIT (June 9, 2015), https://www.reddit 
.com/r/SteamBot/comments/394o9d/understanding_item_ids/ [https://perma 
.cc/BYJ6-N7FC]. For more information on how this identification code is cre-
ated, see id. 
27 See id. 
28 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 162–63. 
29 See, e.g., Bragg v. Linden Research, Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 593 (E.D. Pa. 
2007) (Second Life’s publisher exercised its control over in-game property to 
revoke a plot of digital land “owned” by the plaintiff); Steam Subscriber Agree-
ment, VALVE, INC. (Jan. 1, 2016), http://store.steampowered.com/subscriber 
_agreement/ [https://perma.cc/ERU3-88VG] (“All title, ownership rights and 
intellectual property rights in and to the Content and Services and any and all 
copies thereof, are owned by Valve and/or its or its affiliates’ licensors.”); Bliz-
zard’s EULA provides in pertinent part: 
Blizzard is the owner or licensee of all right, title, and interest 
in and to the Battle.net Client, Battle.net, the Games, Accounts, 
and all of the features and components thereof .... The following 
components of Battle.net and/or the Games, are owned or li-
censed by Blizzard ... 4. Items: Virtual goods, currency, potions, 
wearable items, pets, mounts, etc. 
Battle.net® End User License Agreement, BLIZZARD ENT. (Feb. 28, 2015), http:// 
us.blizzard.com/en-us/company/legal/eula.html [https://perma.cc/J2JS-QNQH]. 
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agreements the publisher obtains at least some right of ownership 
over any virtual items in the game.30 
 For users, this is, of course, problematic. In many cases, 
users will have obtained virtual property through the investment 
of either in-game time and labor or real money purchases.31 
Additionally, in nearly all virtual worlds utilizing virtual property, 
lucrative markets have sprung up, either sanctioned by the publish-
ers or not, permitting sales of these goods.32 Despite the disclaimers 
in EULAs and other agreements, publishers rarely invoke their 
rights to control property held by users.33 Practically speaking, 
therefore, game publishers have given users the expectation of 
property rights in virtual items that can be bought, sold, and 
otherwise transferred as with tangible property.34 There is a clear 
conflict between users’ contracted rights in the respective software 
usage agreements and what is implicitly permitted by publishers.35 
 While, as mentioned previously, there is no case law as of 
yet directly addressing the issue, there is some amount of academic 
scholarship surrounding these ownership conflicts and how they 
ought to be treated by courts.36 While some argue that the current 
state of EULAs and other agreements is likely to remain in place,37 
other scholars have made arguments against EULAs including 
but not limited to substantial unconscionability, an unreasonable 
restraint on goods, a lack of business necessity for such harsh 
terms, and the distribution of property falling outside of players’ 
expectations.38 Others have suggested that public policy concerns 
                                                                                                            
30 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030; see supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
31 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 187. 
32 Id. at 178. 
33 See, e.g., Statistics, VACBANNED (Nov. 5, 2016), http://www.vacbanned 
.com/view/statistics [https://perma.cc/3BFZ-V6TD]. Of the over 179 million 
Steam accounts currently in existence, only 1.8 percent have been “banned,” or 
excluded from playing or otherwise interacting with certain games or property 
the account owners have purchased. Id. 
34 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 178. 
35 Id. 
36 See, e.g., id.; Andrea Vanina Arias, Note, Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of 
Swords and Armor: Regulating the Theft of Virtual Goods, 57 EMORY L.J. 1301, 
1303–04, 1308–09 (2008); see generally Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property 
Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the Rights of Owners, Program-
mers and Virtual Avatars, 39 AKRON L. REV. 649 (2006); Allen Chein, Note, A 
Practical Look at Virtual Property, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1059 (2006). 
37 Chein, supra note 36, at 1090. 
38 Arias, supra note 36, at 1332. 
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will require legislative regulation over both EULAs and virtual 
property in general.39 However, until there is either a common 
law ruling or statute enacted regarding the subject, the state of 
virtual property will remain legally in limbo for both game pub-
lishers and users.40 
II. THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET GAMBLING  
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF  2006 
 One possible way the U.S. government might approach 
regulation of virtual property, particularly when it comes to gam-
bling, is through the UIGEA. Enacted in 2006, the UIGEA is the 
most recent evolution of the Wire Act of 1961,41 which Congress orig-
inally enacted to combat betting connected with organized crime.42 
The UIGEA prohibits any “person engaged in the business of 
betting or wagering” from “knowingly” accepting: (1) “credit” 
(including funds extended from credit cards); (2) “electronic fund[s] 
transfer[s]”; (3) “any check[s], draft[s], or similar instrument[s]”; 
or (4) “the proceeds of any other form of financial transaction,” as 
jointly prescribed by the Federal Reserve.43 Though this seems 
fairly straightforward, certain aspects of the statute deserve 
closer inspection, especially in light of a potential application to 
virtual property and virtual property gambling markets. 
 In the Findings, attached to the law, Congress noted that, 
in the United States, “Internet gambling is a growing cause of 
debt collection problems,” and “traditional law enforcement mecha-
nisms are often inadequate for enforcing gambling prohibitions or 
regulations on the Internet, especially where such gambling 
crosses State or national borders.”44 Though some feel that these 
stated purposes for the UIGEA are perfectly legitimate and 
reasonable,45 others have claimed that conservative lawmakers’ 
                                                                                                            
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 1332–33, 1337–38. 
41 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012). 
42 James Romoser, Note, Unstacking the Deck: The Legalization of Online 
Poker, 50 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 519, 526 (2013). 
43 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006). 
44 Id. § 5361(a)(3)?(4). 
45 Michael A. Tselnik, Note, Check, Raise, or Fold: Poker and the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1617, 1668 (2007). 
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moral disdain for gambling fueled its passage.46 Nonetheless, 
these intended applications of the law have continued to shape its 
real-world uses since its passage.47 
 Beyond discussion of the possible legislation of morality 
inherent in the UIGEA, there are also concerns with its ambiguous 
construction.48 Importantly, the UIGEA does not explicitly pro-
hibit an individual from gambling on the Internet.49 It instead 
attacks the revenue stream for the gambling markets and pro-
viders by making it illegal for banks and institutions engaged in 
the gambling business to knowingly accept funds electronically to 
be used for an illegal bet or wager.50 It defines “bet or wager” as: 
(a) “the staking or risking of something of value upon the outcome 
of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a game subject to chance”; 
(b) lottery-type games in “which opportunity to win is predomi-
nantly subject to chance”; (c) unlawful sports gambling as defined 
in 28 U.S.C. § 3702; or (d) “any instruction or information pertaining 
to the establishment or movement of funds by the bettor or 
customer in, to, or from an account” for the purpose of betting.51 
 With these key terms defined, the UIGEA can be further 
broken down into five elements: (1) a bet or wager must be placed; 
(2) on the Internet; (3) that is knowingly accepted; (4) in a juris-
diction where external laws (state or federal) make such a bet 
illegal; and (5) that exemptions for certain intrastate and tribal 
gambling operations (including state lotteries and Indian casinos) 
are not met.52 Note that this largely requires other laws already 
on the books to be broken in order for the UIGEA to apply.53 
 According to federal prosecutors, major online poker com-
panies in 2011 satisfied these elements as required by law.54 The 
                                                                                                            
46 Romoser, supra note 42, at 520. 
47 Id. at 520?21. 
48 Id. at 536. 
49 Andrew M. Nevill, Note, Folded Industry? Black Friday’s Effect on the 
Future of Online Poker in the United States, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 
203, 210 (2013). 
50 Id. 
51 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A)–(D) (2006). 
52 Thomas A. Flynn, Note, The Ace in the Hole: Why the Unlawful Internet 
Gambling Enforcement Act Did Not Categorically Ban Online Poker in the 
United States, 5 GEO. MASON J. INT’L COM. L. 75, 84 (2013). 
53 Romoser, supra note 42, at 531. 
54 Harris, supra note 1. 
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three largest providers of Internet poker in the United States, 
along with key individuals in their organizations, were charged 
with a multitude of criminal activities, including bank fraud, 
conspiracy, violating the UIGEA, money laundering, and operating 
an illegal gambling business.55 Regarding the UIGEA charges, 
the illegal betting element was met under 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (the 
“Illegal Gambling Business Act”) and 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspiracy 
to commit offense or defraud in the United States).56 In the end, 
the three major poker sites under indictment reached settlements 
with the U.S. government wherein, among other things, they 
agreed to leave the United States market and would not return 
“until it is legal to do so under U.S. law.”57 
III.  THE APPLICATION OF THE UIGEA TO  
VIRTUAL PROPERTY BETTING 
 When considering whether UIGEA would apply to current 
virtual property betting markets, there are several aspects to 
consider: (a) whether virtual property, like tangible property, has 
real value; (b) the types of gambling done with virtual items; and 
(c) the various parties involved in these betting markets to whom 
the UIGEA could be applied. This section will examine these 
questions in-depth. 
A.  Does Virtual Property Have Real Value to Satisfy the UIGEA? 
 The first element to qualify an action for enforcement 
under the UIGEA is that a bet or wager must be placed.58 Key to 
the definition of “bet or wager” within the UIGEA is that “something 
                                                                                                            
55 Flynn, supra note 52, at 88; see also U.S. ATT’Y S.D.N.Y. PRESS RELEASE, 
supra note 1. 
56 Flynn, supra note 52, at 94. 
57 Id. at 92. As a result, there are currently only a handful of online poker 
websites available nationally to United States customers, which suffer from both 
a lack of player base and uncertainty regarding any funds deposited into the 
system. Id. at 79. However, three states—Nevada, Delaware, and New Jersey—
currently offer intrastate online poker clients, which can only be accessed and 
used within the individual states. The Associated Press, Online gaming called 
‘new frontier’ for states, LAS VEGAS REV. J., Oct. 22, 2013, https://www.re 
viewjournal.com/business/online-gaming-called-new-frontier-for-states/ [https:// 
perma.cc/ST6Z-J5ZW]. 
58 Flynn, supra note 52, at 84. 
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of value” must be staked or wagered as part of the bet.59 As 
previously discussed, there is a great deal of debate over whether 
in-game items truly have value: on one hand, the EULAs for 
virtually all games state that in-game items are not owned by the 
player; by not giving users ownership over their own items, 
publishers are essentially stating that these items have no prac-
tical real-world value since there is no explicit license given in 
most agreements to sell or otherwise transfer the publisher’s 
property.60 This would suggest that this element of the UIGEA is 
unsatisfied, and thus the law would not apply to virtual 
property—indeed, two district courts have ruled separately that 
virtual currency has no real value when it comes to gambling, 
largely because the Terms of Use for each game in question state 
that the currency in question has no value.61 
On the other hand, however, many publishers have either 
tacitly allowed or explicitly created marketplaces or other sys-
tems by which users are able to exchange real money for in-game 
items.62 In some cases, these only serve to confuse the issue 
further. One such example is the Steam Marketplace, a place 
within the Steam client, which allows users to buy and sell items 
from at least forty different games with a “wallet” of funds 
deposited into the Steam system and tied to each individual user 
account.63 Though one must utilize real money in order to deposit 
                                                                                                            
59 31 U.S.C. § 5362 (2006). 
60 Ackerman, supra note 17, at 163. 
61 Kater v. Churchill Downs Inc., No. C15-612 MJP, 2015 WL 9839755, at 
*4 (W.D. Wash. 2015) (ruling that because the Terms of Use state that users 
have no property interest in any virtual item; virtual items may not be trans-
ferred, sold, or purchased; and virtual items have no monetary value; any user 
doing so is attempting to sue Defendant for their own breach of contract); Mason 
v. Machine Zone, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 3d 457, 465 (D. Md. 2015) (ruling that, once 
Plaintiff had purchased virtual currency, she had swapped something of value 
for “something of whimsy” which had no value). Note that both of these cases 
involved virtual currency purchased directly from the publisher, and declared 
to be strictly for usage within the specific software, unlike Steam items, which 
have a built-in framework for trading and other types of transactions between 
users. See Assael, supra note 4. 
62 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 17, at 157; Arias, supra note 36, at 1302. 
63 Community Market, VALVE, INC., http://www.steamcommunity.com/mar 
ket/ [https://perma.cc/8H38-QD2F]; see also Community Market FAQ, VALVE, 
INC., https://support.steampowered.com/kb_article.php?ref=6088-UDXM-7214 
[https://perma.cc/2WT2-B7FT]. 
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these funds, once the user transfers them to the Steam system, 
they are no longer the user’s property according to the EULA.64 
Additionally, any items traded, purchased, or sold in the Steam 
Marketplace are license rights, in which there is no ownership 
interest, and Valve does not recognize any trades or sales made 
outside of Steam.65 With that said, however, it seems likely that, 
because in-game Steam items are convertible to real money through 
any process, even a circuitous one, they indeed have “value.”66 
 The contractual validity of this EULA aside, Valve con-
tinues to muddy the waters further within Steam. Despite its 
staunch stance that Steam funds have no real monetary value, 
the IRS requires Valve to file a Form 1099 (used to report mis-
cellaneous income) for any U.S.-based users who meet a certain 
threshold of virtual market transactions per year based on these 
sales.67 In other words, regardless of what Valve may believe or 
publicly state regarding the real-world monetary value of any 
items and funds currently within the Steam trading community,68 
the United States government, at least, already feels that these 
items do in fact have value and should be viewed through that lens. 
 Without any case law or other statutory guidance, this real 
value requirement in the UIGEA remains undecided, but there 
are strong arguments to be made in favor of virtual property 
having real value.69 There is the practical consideration that in-
game items are often traded for real money, whether through a 
publisher-sanctioned marketplace or through a “black market” of 
                                                                                                            
64 According to the text of the agreement, once funds have been added to the 
Steam Wallet, they are “non-refundable and non-transferable. Steam Wallet 
funds do not constitute a personal property right, have no value outside Steam 
and ... have no cash value and are not exchangeable for cash.” Steam Sub-
scriber Agreement, supra note 29. 
65 Id. 
66 Anita Ramasastry, Could Second Life Be In Serious Trouble? The Risk of 
Real-Life Legal Consequences for Hosting Virtual Gambling, FINDLAW (Apr. 11, 
2007), http://supreme.findlaw.com/legal-commentary/could-second-life-be-in-seri 
ous-trouble-the-risk-of-real-life-legal-consequences-for-hosting-virtual-gambling 
.html [https://perma.cc/8L5E-MQ5Y] (discussing whether the in-game currency in 
Second Life, the “Linden Dollar,” would be subject to UIGEA scrutiny). 
67 Community Market FAQ, supra note 63. 
68 Steam Subscriber Agreement, supra note 29. 
69 See Kurt Hunt, This Land Is Not Your Land: Second Life, CopyBot, and 
the Looming Question of Virtual Property Rights, 9 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 
141, 158–59 (2007). 
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sorts.70 This, coupled with the fact that the IRS considers said 
items to have value to the point where they are taxable, suggests 
that virtual property should be considered “something of value,” 
thus satisfying the definition in the UIGEA.71 
B.  Does the Type of Gambling Generally Done With Virtual 
Items Satisfy the Requirements Set Forth in the UIGEA? 
 Along with the value requirement embedded within the 
definitions of the UIGEA, the Act also defines the types of bets or 
gambling within its scope.72 This wording leads to a range of 
possible activities the UIGEA covers, including obvious examples 
like lotteries,73 roulette, and other casino-like games of chance.74 
Although online poker, via the Black Friday indictments, was the 
most prominent application of the UIGEA to this point, there 
have been judicial affirmations of its applicability to some of these 
other forms of gambling as well.75 
 Beyond the traditional games of chance, the UIGEA would 
likely also extend to betting on professional eSports matches as 
well.76 The First Circuit has ruled that bets on traditional sporting 
events qualify under the Act.77 Although eSports, as a fairly new 
                                                                                                            
70 See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 17, at 157; Arias, supra note 36, at 1302. 
71 See I.R.S. Notice 2014-21, 2014-16 IRB 938. 
72 Flynn, supra note 52, at 86. “[S]taking or risking by any person of some-
thing of value upon the outcome of a contest of others, a sporting event, or a 
game subject to chance, upon an agreement or understanding that the person 
or another person will receive something of value in the event of a certain out-
come.” See 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(B) (2012) (“[lottery-type games in] which oppor-
tunity to win is predominantly subject to chance”). 
73 Id. § 5362(1)(B) (“The term ‘bet or wager’ ... includes the purchase of a 
chance or opportunity to win a lottery ....”) 
74 Id. § 5362(1)(A) (“The term ‘bet or wager’ ... means the staking or risking 
by any person of something of value upon the outcome of ... a game subject to 
chance ....”); see D. A. Norris, Annotation, What are games of chance, games of 
skill, and mixed games of chance and skill, 135 A.L.R. 104 (1941). 
75 See, e.g., California v. Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel, No. 14cv2724, 2014 
WL 12526720, at *8 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (determining that bingo, as well as poker, 
would qualify as a violation of UIGEA). 
76 § 5362(1)(A) (“The term ‘bet or wager’ ... means the staking or risking by 
any person of something of value upon the outcome of ... a sporting event ....”) 
77 United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 729 (1st Cir. 2014) (Defendant was 
taking bets on sporting events via the Internet; the court ruled that these bets 
qualified as “unlawful gambling” under UIGEA). 
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industry, has had very little attention in the form of academic 
studies to this point, at least some contemporary commentators 
argue that it fits within the traditional boundaries of a sport,78 
thus permitting regulation under the UIGEA per the First Circuit.79 
Additionally, even if one does not consider eSports to qualify as 
sporting events as specifically named in section 5362(1)(A), they 
would still likely qualify under this subsection, due to the fact 
that any competitive eSports match is “a contest of others.”80 
 Virtual property gambling has encompassed all of the above 
types of betting, and others as well. Second Life players hosted 
virtual slot machines, poker, and blackjack in 2007.81 Currently, 
using CS:GO property alone, one can make bets on eSports and 
traditional sports, or play games of chance, including virtual slots, 
dice games, coin flips, and roulette spins.82 Because it seems 
likely that wagers made with virtual property satisfy the value 
requirement of UIGEA, and wagers on these types of games 
satisfy the definitions of gambling under the Act, it is therefore 
likely that the types of gambling typically done using virtual 
property would qualify to be regulated under the UIGEA. 
C.  If the U.S. Government Decided to Invoke the UIGEA Against 
Virtual Property Gambling, Which Parties Would Be Liable 
Under the Act? 
 If the U.S. government does target Internet providers of 
virtual property gambling with the UIGEA, there are two primary 
types of parties which might be liable under the provisions of the 
Act: game publishers and third-party gambling providers.83 As 
discussed previously, UIGEA applications target the revenue 
stream for Internet gambling providers by making it illegal to 
receive payments connected to these bets.84 Because the creators 
                                                                                                            
78 See, e.g., Hamari, supra note 3 (eSports is defined as “a form of sports 
where the primary aspects of the sport are facilitated by electronic systems.”) 
(emphasis added). 
79 See Lyons, 740 F.3d at 729 (noting that it is illegal to transmit or receive 
a sports bet in interstate commerce). 
80 § 5362(1)(A). 
81 See Ramasastry, supra note 66. 
82 See Assael, supra note 4. 
83 See Ramasastry, supra note 66. 
84 According to the Congressional Research Service, “[t]he Unlawful Inter-
net Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) seeks to cut off the flow of revenue to 
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of any virtual property are the ones initially releasing said 
property into the wider marketplace in exchange for an initial 
payment, if not ongoing control over the virtual items or currency 
within their virtual worlds, they would likely fall squarely within 
the crosshairs of the Justice Department as it attempts to wield 
UIGEA provisions.85 If, as in Second Life, third parties are 
actually using the game world itself to host casino games and other 
forms of betting, it is likely that the answer is yes.86 The UIGEA 
holds liable “a financial transaction provider, or any interactive 
computer service or telecommunications service” with knowledge 
and control of bets and which owns, controls, operates, manages, 
supervises, or directs any Internet website at which gambling takes 
place.87 This appears to be fairly straightforward; for those games 
in which transactions and other monetary (via currency or other 
forms of valuable property) interactions take place, the publishers 
would likely face an uphill battle to show a lack of liability. 
 For those publishers that do not directly host their own in-
world currency, unlike Second Life, there is an additional layer of 
abstraction. As Valve, developer and publisher of CS:GO, is re-
sponsible for a considerable gambling economy stemming from its 
games, it will serve as a useful case study for this subsection.88 
 In order to purchase items from Valve, including keys or 
other items, a user must first deposit real money into their Steam 
account, which converts that money to Steam credit and is non-
refundable back into real money.89 Valve currently accepts 
deposits via PayPal, an electronic money transferring service, and 
credit cards.90 The UIGEA prohibits persons engaged in the 
business of betting or wagering from knowingly accepting, in con-
nection with unlawful Internet gambling: “credit, or the proceeds 
of credit ... (including credit extended through the use of a credit 
                                                                                                            
unlawful Internet gambling business. It outlaws receipt of checks, credit card 
charges, electronic funds transfers, and the like by such businesses.” Flynn, 
supra note 52, at 82. 
85 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 94–99 (discussing the process of 
obtaining virtual items in CS:GO). 
86 See Ramasastry, supra note 66. 
87 31 U.S.C. § 5367 (2006). 
88 CS:GO item gambling alone accounted for an estimated $5 billion in wa-
gers in 2016. Assael, supra note 4. 
89 Id. 
90 Community Market FAQ, supra note 63. 
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card)” and “an electronic fund transfer, or funds transmitted by 
or through a money transmitting business, or the proceeds of an 
electronic fund transfer or money transmitting service ....”91 These 
provisions certainly cover both credit card payments and PayPal 
transfers, and it is likely that any gambling involving virtual 
property on Valve’s platform qualifies as unlawful.92 However, 
there are two further elements of this statute to satisfy before 
Valve is clearly liable. 
 The first additional element that must be met is the 
“knowingly” requirement embedded in this section.93 Valve is 
certainly aware that not an insignificant portion of its customers 
are using their in-game items for gambling; in 2016, it sent more 
than forty cease-and-desist letters to websites taking bets and 
wagers using CS:GO items.94 Some Steam users, however, pre-
sumably never use any of their Steam Wallet funds to purchase 
virtual property; and of those users who do possess certain in-
game items, some never use their items to gamble.95 Unlike the 
Internet poker companies targeted on Black Friday or the defen-
dant in Lyons, Valve might have a plausible argument that it has 
never knowingly accepted any deposit to be used for illegal 
gambling.96 Valve receives many deposits each day and has no 
way of knowing which will be used to purchase virtual property 
to be wagered, and which will simply be used to purchase games 
or other things within the Steam system. 
 Unfortunately, the lack of judicial precedent on the matter 
limits any forecast regarding this argument.97 One potential 
                                                                                                            
91 31 U.S.C. § 5363(1)?(2) (2012). 
92 See Lawrence Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic Payment 
System Risks: Lessons from PayPal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261, 280–81 (2016). 
93 § 5363. 
94 Assael, supra note 4. 
95 For example, Valve has sold 21 million copies of CS:GO, and while more 
than three million people wagered virtual items in 2015, that obviously leaves 
many purchasers of the game who did not gamble. See Joshua Brustein & Eben 
Novy-Williams, Virtual Weapons Are Turning Teen Gamers Into Serious Gam-
blers, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-vir 
tual-guns-counterstrike-gambling/ [https://perma.cc/9TX5-W9YX] 
96 See Harris, supra note 1 (including the indictment against the three pro-
viders); see also United States v. Lyons, 740 F.3d 702, 714 (1st Cir. 2014). 
97 See supra text accompanying notes 19–20. 
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analogy might be found in money laundering, in which the law 
states that the government need not “show that funds withdrawn 
from the defendant’s account could not possibly have come from 
any source other than the unlawful activity.”98 In other words, if 
an individual or institution is knowingly receiving funds from 
both legitimate and illegitimate sources, all funds are tainted.99 
Similarly, a court faced with a complaint against Valve under the 
UIGEA might conclude that all deposits are tainted because 
Valve is knowingly receiving both legitimate and illegitimate 
deposits, and separating out the individual sources of each is 
immaterial and defeats the purpose of the UIGEA.100 
 The remaining additional element in the UIGEA is the 
requirement that a defendant must be “engaged in the business 
of betting or wagering ....”101 Valve has argued that it neither runs 
nor endorses any of the gambling surrounding Steam items;102 be-
cause of this, they are not “engaged” in the gambling industry.103 
There are two major avenues, however, where this argument might 
fail, one of which applies to game publishers generally and one 
specifically to Valve. 
 First, a primary concern for any company offering virtual 
property in some way is that investigators or regulatory agencies 
will determine that the company’s policies are inexorably tied up 
in gambling operation making use of the items it offers, and thus 
it is indeed “engaged in the business of betting or wagering ....”104 
The argument specifically against Valve revolves around “cases,” 
the primary method of obtaining in-game items in CS:GO.105 
Players obtain these cases, which are essentially virtual item 
                                                                                                            
98 United States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562, 570 (10th Cir. 1999). 
99 Id. The court explains that, once commingled, legitimate and illegitimate 
funds are indistinguishable, which would defeat the entire purpose of money-
laundering statutes. Id. 
100 Id.; see also Assael, supra note 4. 
101 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2012). 
102 In-Game Item Trading Update, VALVE, INC. (July 13, 2016), http://store 
.steampowered.com/news/22883/ [https://perma.cc/3PYC-G8VL]. Valve backed 
this assertion by sending the many cease-and-desist notices to gambling sites 
in 2016. Assael, supra note 4. 
103 In-Game Item Trading Update, supra note 102. 
104 § 5363. 
105 Assael, supra note 4. 
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containers, through the ordinary course of playing the game.106 
Any player willing to purchase a $2.49 “key” from Valve can 
“open” the case, which triggers a randomized wheel that selects a 
virtual item for the player to keep.107 These items range in value 
on the Steam Market and other marketplaces from a few cents to 
thousands of dollars.108 Unlike a traditional bet, the user is 
guaranteed to receive an item in exchange for their $2.49; 
however, it is far more likely than not that the item she receives 
is “worth” considerably less than her investment.109 
 It is possible that courts would consider this to be a form of 
gambling. Under the UIGEA, activities considered to be bets or 
wagers include those which stake or risk “something of value upon 
the outcome of ... a game subject to chance, upon an agreement or 
understanding that the person or another person will receive 
something of value in the event of a certain outcome.”110 The key 
question is whether a case opening qualifies as one of these events. 
Case openings, which in some ways simulate a virtual slot machine, 
are subject to chance and randomness;111 however, unlike, say, a 
traditional slot machine, a spin of which is fully randomized and 
often results in no prize,112 a user opening a case is guaranteed to 
receive an in-game item from their investment.113 
 While the statutory language within the UIGEA is vague 
regarding which “certain outcomes” qualify,114 there is some case 
law which may help evaluate case openings with more focus.115 
Consumers may purchase packs of trading cards, which are 
guaranteed to include a set number of cards within them.116 These 
packs have a chance to include “insert” or “chase” cards, which 
are rarer and more desirable to card collectors, and thus more 
                                                                                                            
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A) (2012). 
111 Assael, supra note 4. 
112 Norris, supra note 74. 
113 Assael, supra note 4. 
114 § 5362(1)(A). 
115 See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Intern., LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 
2002); see also Price v. Pinnacle Brands, Inc., 138 F.3d 602, 604 (5th Cir. 1998). 
116 See, e.g., Price, 138 F.3d at 604. 
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valuable on the secondary market.117 The Ninth Circuit held in 
Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Intern., LP that opening a pack and not 
receiving a “insert” card is not a cognizable injury, as consumers 
receive value in the form of a certain number of cards, which may 
or may not include an “insert” card, in exchange for what they 
paid as a purchase price.118 However, the court did not rule on 
whether the act of opening a pack was indeed a form of gambling, 
instead simply deciding that even if the defendants’ activities did 
constitute illegal gambling, it was immaterial to the final 
holding.119 The Fifth Circuit has found similarly as well.120 
 The trading card cases were the forerunners to McLeod v. 
Valve Corp., in which the Western District of Washington similarly 
dismissed plaintiffs’ claims, with heavy reliance upon the 
holdings from the trading card analogues.121 McLeod is relevant 
in this discussion because the court recognized that virtual items 
are analogous to tangible property in the form of trading cards, 
and that by betting with their virtual items, plaintiffs had “an 
opportunity to win and received a benefit of their bargain,” 
analogous to Chaset.122 Thus, the argument in that case that 
consumers receive exactly what they pay for would likely transfer 
to case openings as well—that is, for their $2.49, CS:GO players 
receive a single item, which has the chance to be something of 
high scarcity and rarity.123 This suggests that courts feel as 
though consumers receive something of value in every outcome 
when they open a pack or a case, which would likely defeat the 
UIGEA’s “certain outcome” language if Valve was ever challenged 
                                                                                                            
117 See, e.g., Chaset, 300 F.3d at 1086. 
118 Id. at 1087. 
119 Id. at 1087–88. 
120 See, e.g., Price, 138 F.3d at 607–08. Note, however, that both Chaset and 
Price were not cases brought under UIGEA; rather, they were claims against 
the trading card distributors under anti-racketeering statutes. Both cases were 
dismissed due to plaintiffs’ lack of standing under these statutes. 
121 See McLeod v. Valve Corp., No. C16-1227-JCC, 2016 WL 5792695, at *4 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 4, 2016). Like Chaset and Price, this is not a UIGEA case; 
rather, plaintiffs attempted to sue under anti-racketeering law. Note that 
McLeod has no direct relevance to case openings, which are not referred to once 
throughout the decision. Id. at *1–5. 
122 Id. at *4. 
123 Assael, supra note 4. 
 
2017]  LOSING THE DIGITAL SHIRT 341 
on this issue specifically in court, suggesting that Valve (or other 
publishers who in the future implement a similar system into 
their own games) would not be liable under the UIGEA for these 
sorts of virtual item sales and distributions.124 
 While it is uncertain whether game publishers, such as 
Valve, would be liable under the UIGEA, the other major parties 
the U.S. government might target would be the companies spe-
cifically taking advantage of the existence of virtual items and 
actually hosting and providing gambling services with the items 
as currency.125 Once again, the system Valve has built into Steam 
serves as a useful case study. Steam operates using an access 
system which allows third parties to engage with and utilize the 
platform.126 This approach gives Valve a great deal of flexibility 
and openness to innovation from Steam users; on the other hand, 
it also allows third parties to take advantage of Steam’s infra-
tructure, including item inventories and trading, to engage in a 
variety of different activities, including gambling.127 For these 
entities, the analysis is less convoluted than that of Valve; they 
are in the business of betting or wagering, in connection with 
unlawful gambling on the Internet, and are knowingly accepting 
payments for that purpose.128 
 One possible defense for item gambling websites is that the 
UIGEA does not specifically discuss virtual items as a prohibited 
form of payment.129 However, the government could use several 
arguments to get around this defense. First, as mentioned pre-
viously, section 5363(2) of the UIGEA prohibits electronic fund 
transfers.130 An electronic fund transfer is defined as “any transfer of 
funds ... which is initiated through an electronic terminal ... or 
                                                                                                            
124 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1)(A) (2006). 
125 Id. § 5362(10)(A); Assael, supra note 4. 
126 Assael, supra note 4. This system is called an “application programming 
interface” (API). Anyone may obtain access to Steam’s API system, so long as 
they possess a Steam account, fill out a form, and agree to the API terms of 
use. Steam Web API Documentation, VALVE, INC., https://steamcommunity.com 
/dev [https://perma.cc/A6W7-JD4W]. 
127 Assael, supra note 4. 
128 See 31 U.S.C. § 5363 (2006). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. § 5363(2). 
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computer ... so as to order, instruct, or authorize a financial insti-
tution to debit or credit an account.”131 Any transaction involving 
Steam items is necessarily initiated electronically, as there are no 
real items involved; however, it is very unlikely that a court would 
decide that a gambling website qualifies as a financial institution.132 
 Should this subsection of the UIGEA fail, the government 
may instead invoke section 5363(4), which permits the Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve to issue regulations defining additional 
types of transactions that qualify under the UIGEA.133 This sub-
section also applies to financial institutions, but provides consider-
able leeway to the Federal Reserve to decide on how a financial 
institution is involved in order to invoke the Act.134 This is not a 
sure thing, however, with the current construction of the UIGEA; 
unlike, for example, the complaints against the online poker compa-
nies, there are no payment processors or financial institutions in-
volved for any gambling website dealing strictly in virtual items.135 
 Virtual item gambling currently exists in a legal gray 
area.136 While the UIGEA is not the only statute regulating 
gambling in the United States,137 it has been applied recently and 
effectively against gambling establishments existing strictly on 
the Internet, most notably the poker sites on Black Friday.138 
Though both game publishers and gambling providers would have 
defenses against Department of Justice prosecutors relying upon 
                                                                                                            
131 15 U.S.C. § 1693a(7) (2012). 
132 A financial institution is defined as a private or public organization that 
acts “as a channel between savers and borrowers of funds.” Financial Institu-
tion, BUSINESS DICTIONARY, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/fi 
nancial-institution.html [https://perma.cc/989H-YYPV]. 
133 31 U.S.C. § 5363(4) (2006). 
134 Id. “In other words, even if a form of funds does not fit in the first three 
categories, the Federal Reserve could issue a regulation to deem its system to 
fall within the fourth, catch-all category.” Ramasastry, supra note 66. 
135 See First Amended Complaint at 4, U.S. v. PokerStars II Civ. 2564 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/FullTiltAmendSuit _Sept 
20_2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/M38X-2JK3] (alleging that the defendants de-
ceived U.S. banks and financial institutions with the aid of “highly compen-
sated third party payment processors.”) 
136 Chris Grove, Understanding Skin Gambling, NARUS ADVISORS 5 (2016), 
http://www.esportsbettingreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/A-Guide-To 
-Skin-Gambling.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W9Q-JPUB]. 
137 Id. 
138 Harris, supra note 1. 
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the UIGEA, they may very well be found liable both civilly and 
criminally under the Act.139 
IV.  PUBLIC POLICY AND THE UIGEA 
 Like any governmental regulation of a consumer activity, 
the potential application of the UIGEA to virtual item betting has 
inherent concerns.140 This Part will first discuss the sound public 
policy reasons to pursue regulation of virtual property, via the 
UIGEA or otherwise, then conclude by discussing the way the Act 
might be implemented, as well as other options aside from the 
UIGEA. 
A. Arguments in Favor of Federal Regulation of Virtual Property 
 The UIGEA was originally enacted under the pretext of ad-
dressing increasing gambling debt, especially debt accrued via 
Internet gambling, which was not well-regulated at the time of 
the Act’s passage.141 Although virtual item gambling is not seen 
in the same way as more mainstream gambling games, it none-
theless is just as effective as more traditional betting in getting 
people addicted and in debt.142 Even worse, because much of this 
virtual property being wagered comes from video games, many of 
those afflicted are under-aged.143 It seems logical, in a country 
where casino gambling is heavily regulated,144 that the easy 
                                                                                                            
139 31 U.S.C. § 5365 (2006). 
140 Tselnik, supra note 45, at 1627, 1632. 
141 31 U.S.C. § 5361(3)?(4) (2006). 
142 Assael, supra note 4 (explaining that virtual items “are a highly effective 
tool for hooking those predisposed for addiction”). 
143 Though many gamers in general are adults, of the 155 million Americans 
who played video games in 2015, twenty-six percent are under the age of eigh-
teen. Essential Facts About the Computer and Video Game Industry, ENT. SOFT-
WARE ASS’N (2015), http://www.theesa.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/ESA-Es 
sential-Facts-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC2J-2655]. Assael, supra note 4 (“Kids 
are ‘becoming gambling addicts at [thirteen] ....’”). 
144 Most states have enacted some sort of minimum gambling age statute, 
and many of those without one do not have casinos available within their bor-
ders. Complete Guide to USA Casino Gambling, CASINO.ORG, 2017, https://www 
.casino.org/us/guide/ [https://perma.cc/3AMD-G2W8]. 
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availability of virtual property betting for children and others 
would be problematic.145 
 Underage gambling is understandably a major concern for 
watchdogs and others in eSports.146 However, other concerns 
around eSports gambling have plagued the industry as well, as 
the amount of money at stake has increased.147 One of the most 
notable examples of this occurred in 2015 in the iBUYPOWER 
scandal, in which arguably the best American CS:GO team 
“threw,” or intentionally lost, a professional match against a team 
they should have handily defeated.148 By placing virtual item bets 
upon themselves to lose on both their own and a multitude of 
other Steam accounts, the players received nearly $7,000 in 
virtual items for the loss, and others in the know prior to the loss 
profited even more.149 After the scandal came to light, Valve 
banned all of the players complicit in the match-fix, as well as 
others strongly linked to it, from professional play in Valve-
sponsored events indefinitely, citing the impact that events like 
match-fixing have “on the health and stability of [the] sport.”150 
Events like this are made possible in part by the unregulated 
nature of virtual property; unlike traditional, brick-and-mortar 
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casinos which are heavily regulated,151 the lack of oversight in 
virtual property and eSports betting continues to make scandals 
like match fixing more possible than in other betting markets.152 
 It is, of course, possible for the government to criminalize 
outright online gambling, with or without virtual property; as the 
poker example shows, however, even with very limited legal op-
tions available, American citizens will seek out those sites which 
still remain available to them.153 It is better for those who do wish 
to partake in gambling that the government does regulate pro-
viders, as it is safer if the government is able to establish a market 
and regulate it to prevent fraudulent or illegitimate parties from 
preying on American gamblers.154 Further, regulations allowing 
virtual item gambling would likely attract more established, 
legitimate providers into the American market, as the looming 
risk of the UIGEA or other criminal statutes would no longer 
exist.155 It is even possible that publishers like Valve would them-
selves get involved in the potentially lucrative market, taking 
intermediaries out of the equation and streamlining the market-
place for all involved.156 
 While gambling is the primary concern of this Note, there 
are other concerns stemming from the general lack of regulation 
on virtual property as well (though these concerns are admittedly 
not addressable via UIGEA implementation). Since many virtual 
items are sold via black market transactions—that is, outside any 
marketplace officially sanctioned by game publishers—buyers are 
susceptible to scams and other pitfalls along the way.157 There is 
also the potential for outright theft, for which a victim would have 
no recourse without recognizance of the inherent value in virtual 
property.158 If the goal is fairness and protection for consumers of 
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software which features virtual property, it would seem that 
there is some necessity to reimagine how the public and the courts 
in the United States view said property. 
 Beyond these practical concerns, there would be other 
benefits to regulation of virtual property as well. First and 
foremost is the potential taxation revenue should virtual property 
be recognized as having real value.159 Given the estimated $5 
billion in gambling revenue in 2016 from CS:GO items alone, the 
potential windfall to both state and federal revenue services 
would not be insignificant.160 Additionally, many virtual item 
gambling websites are located outside of U.S. jurisdiction.161 
Should the UIGEA be implemented on virtual property gambling 
sites in a similar way to its implementation against poker 
websites, it can be argued that it is a “protectionist statute geared 
to harbor United States currency from being expatriated off-
shore.”162 As discussed in Part III of this Note, the IRS already 
recognizes income derived from sales of virtual items within 
Steam’s community marketplace.163 It would seem to be a narrow 
conceptual leap to require Valve and other publishers utilizing 
virtual property in their software to track more carefully virtual 
item transactions; practically speaking, however, this might not 
be feasible, given the sheer number of transactions taking place 
on a regular basis.164 
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B. Alternatives to the UIGEA 
 As demonstrated by this Note, the current gray area in 
which virtual property and virtual item gambling reside is not 
likely to last.165 There are a number of good reasons, both sub-
stantive and policy, for government regulation of these markets.166 
While the UIGEA is likely to be a successful method of doing so, 
there are a number of regulatory schemes to which the govern-
ment may look in order to accomplish its goals.167 
 First, there are several anti-gambling statutes currently 
enacted, besides the UIGEA, to which regulators could turn in 
order to crack down on virtual property gambling.168 One of these 
is the Wire Act, which criminalizes the transmission of wagering 
information.169 Rather than targeting the payment providers as 
the UIGEA does,170 the Wire Act targets those “engaged in the 
business of betting or wagering” electronically, originally via 
telephone but now construed to include the Internet as well.171 
The major downside of the Wire Act is that courts have found that 
its statutory language refers only to wagers made on sports.172 
Other statutes have similar limitations; the Travel Act, for 
example, is not enforceable upon new forms of gambling unless 
they have been specifically enumerated.173 Ultimately, of the 
existing anti-gambling statutes, the UIGEA is the newest, and 
likely the best-equipped to handle the unique issues that virtual 
property presents.174 
 Other possible solutions are more regulatory in nature, similar 
to what has been proposed for online poker. One suggestion 
follows the fact that most states that currently allow gambling 
have their own state Gaming Commission or a similar office that 
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regulates all gambling within the state—a nationwide version of 
this equipped specifically to handle and license online gambling, 
including virtual item gambling, would be quite useful for the 
purposes of oversight.175 The inclusion of virtual property currency 
would pose a complication, but as discussed previously, it is similar 
enough to tangible property that doing so should be feasible.176 
 Poker suggests a different solution as well. Currently, 
three states have legalized intrastate online poker networks.177 If 
the federal government were unwilling to step in and regulate 
virtual item gambling on a nationwide basis, states may do so on 
their own, as befits the culture and moral views of each individual 
population.178 The downside of this approach is that, like in poker, 
these sites would only be available to those residing within the 
state itself, and the pool of bettors would be considerably dimin-
ished.179 Still, for those residing in states which would agree to 
legalize these forms of gambling, it would undoubtedly be better 
than nothing.180 
 The final potential regulatory scheme would be a nation-
wide legislative one. Several states have enacted laws recognizing 
new forms of currencies, such as Bitcoin and other cryptocur-
rencies;181 similarly, if Congress were to simply legislate a legal 
understanding of virtual property, many of the issues at question 
in this Note would be cleared up. Even simply recognizing that 
users have property rights in the virtual items they obtain and 
possess would allow software users to enjoy the full legal pro-
tections of existing property laws and regulations,182 and allow 
the IRS or other agencies to treat virtual property just like any 
other form of property for the purposes of regulation and 
taxation.183 This approach would seem preferable, due to its ability 
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to settle a multitude of issues; still, care would have to go into 
crafting any such legislation, and given the moral disdain many 
lawmakers seem to have toward gambling,184 this approach does 
not seem likely to bear fruit in the current political climate. 
CONCLUSION 
 As virtual worlds in video games and other software 
continue to be developed and released to consumers, so too will 
virtual property within those worlds. Currently, there is very 
little regulation of virtual property in the United States, which 
has led to various legally suspect uses of these in-game items. The 
proliferation of websites and other parties offering gambling 
services is perhaps the most notable of these; in the current 
deregulated system, there is nothing stopping individuals from 
creating their own system for taking wagers without any regard 
to whom their customers are. This, however, cannot last—if 
companies such as Valve do not take steps to self-regulate the 
virtual property under their control, it is likely that the U.S. 
government will instead step in, and do so sooner rather than 
later. The UIGEA is one possible method by which it might do so, 
and is one that would likely be successful. Nevertheless, it is not 
so much a matter of if, so much as it is a matter of when and how. 
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